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The death of an important scholar often occasions tributes and reminiscences 
about the thinker’s significance and impact.  The death of G.A. (Jerry) Cohen, on August 
5, 2009, attests to this phenomenon to a remarkable extent.  No sooner was Jerry’s passing 
made known than there was an outpouring of expressions of sadness, affection, and 
esteem from many people, ranging from close friends, colleagues and students, to those 
who had met him but once, or whose encounters were limited to hearing him speak in a 
crowded lecture hall, or reading his writings.   
 There are many reasons for this unusual response.  First, of course, there is 
Cohen’s stature as an outstanding political philosopher and exemplary teacher.  A second, 
crucial, reason is Cohen’s personality and his unique ability to connect with people.  He 
was a warm and generous person, with an enormous and irrepressible sense of fun and 
mischief, humanity and kindness; his joke- telling was legendary, as was his keen sense of 
friendship and loyalty.   
 Another reason for the huge response to Cohen’s passing is the kind of political 
philosopher he was, whose intellectual interests were bound up with his personal 
commitments, the source of which were his family background.  These commitments are 
manifest in all his writings but are particularly manifest in his recent academic inquiry 
into the relation between principles of justice and the obligations of those who espouse 
them.  Born of personal experience and demanding of us that we consider our own 
personal relation to our political creed, Cohen’s political philosophy thus has a specially 
compelling character.   
 All this accounts for, along with the many personal essays, blogs and 
reminiscences, the appearance of some recent significant publications paying tribute to 
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Cohen’s contribution (see The Journal of Ethics 2010; Sypnowich 2006; Cohen 2011). This 
volume of Socialist Studies/Etudes Socialistes joins them, taking as its particular focus 
homage to Jerry Cohen as both philosopher and socialist.  The sense of profound loss is 
evident in the depth of philosophical engagement and keen personal connection 
exhibited in the papers that follow, papers that are written both by scholars who knew 
Cohen personally and others who did not. 
 In this introductory essay I consider Cohen’s intellectual career in light of the 
themes of the essays that follow, suggesting that Cohen’s work might be thought of as 
developing a unique conception of socialism that is, to coin a phrase, both utopian and 
scientific.  Cohen’s analytical Marxism brought a salutary rigour to left wing thought, 
which although it sought to transcend certain limitations in Marx’s methodology, was in 
an important sense true to Marx’s aspiration to be scientific.  At the same time, however, I 
will contend that Cohen was also a utopian socialist in the best sense.  Cohen was 
adamant that one should not give up on an ambitious aspiration for an emancipated 
human society.  This is manifest in his commitment to a radical approach to justice based 
on “principles” rather than “facts,” and moreover his contention that a consistent 
egalitarianism involves personal contribution to the amelioration of disadvantage.  That 
is to say, socialism, for Cohen, would involve an ambitious conception of community, 
where Marx’s principle of “from each according to his abilities, to each according to his 
needs”, would guide both society’s institutions and individuals’ behaviour.  
 
Utopian v. Scientific Socialism 
 
The contrast between utopian and scientific socialism first appears in the 1849 
Communist Manifesto in which Marx and Engels (1978) castigate socialists such as Robert 
Owen and Charles Fourier for being utopian in their methods and goals.  For Marx and 
Engels, these early socialists are utopian because, “They reject all political, and especially 
all revolutionary, action; they wish to attain their ends by peaceful means, and endeavour, 
by small experiments, necessarily doomed to failure, and by force of example, to pave the 
way for the new social Gospel” (Marx and Engels 1978, 498). For Marx and Engels, the 
limitations of utopian socialism can be attributed in part to the under-developed 
character of the working class and its class struggle; the “fantastic pictures of future 
society” were “painted” by utopian socialists “at a time” when the proletariat was “still in 
a very undeveloped state” (Marx and Engels 1978, 498). According to the doctrine of 
historical materialism, genuine social change emanates from existing historical processes 
and thus the working class must seize the opportunities presented by a crisis in 
capitalism, rather than conceiving of revolution as an act of mere will and the realisation 
of good ideas.  Thus Marx scoffed at “recipes for the cookbooks of the future” (Marx 
1978, 299). Engels amplified this argument thirty-one years later in his essay “Socialism: 
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Utopian and Scientific.” There he contends that, in contrast to the utopian approach, 
“socialism became a science” thanks to Marx, who contributed “the materialistic 
conception of history and the revelation of the secret of capitalistic production through 
surplus value” (Engels 1978, 700). 
 Cohen’s concern to set radical thought on a new, scientific basis did not take hold 
at the beginning of his career as a philosopher.  His intellectual trajectory is interesting 
(see the introduction Sypnowich 2006). Born in 1941 to Jewish Communist parents who 
were active in the garment industry’s union movement, Cohen grew up in a milieu of 
radical politics.  At the age of four the young Jerry was sent to a Jewish Communist 
school.  He stayed there until the age of eleven when the school closed after raids by the 
“Red Squad” of the Quebec police in an era of virulent anti-communism.  He grew up 
thoroughly imbued with radical ideas.  However, as an undergraduate at McGill 
University, and then as a graduate student in Oxford, Jerry did not pursue philosophy in 
order to develop his political ideas.  Rather, under the tutelage of philosophers such as 
Gilbert Ryle at New College in Oxford, Cohen was keen to acquire the techniques of 
analytical philosophy.  This was unusual; left-wing students tended to reject Oxford 
philosophy, regarding it, Cohen recalls, as “bourgeois, or trivial, or both.”  However, 
Cohen felt no such hostility.  “I came to Oxford already steeped in Marxism, and so, 
unlike most of my politically congenial contemporaries, I did not look to university 
philosophy to furnish me with ideas that mattered…” (Cohen 1988, xi). 
 For some time, therefore, Cohen’s politics could not be discerned in his 
philosophy.  Moreover, when he began tackling Marxist themes as a philosopher, it was at 
first unaffected by the analytical approach in which he had been schooled. Like many on 
the Left at the time, Cohen was attracted to the work of the French Marxist Louis 
Althusser, whose grand statements seemed “exciting and suggestive” if difficult to pin 
down (Cohen 2000, xxi). By the late 1960s, however, Cohen began taking an analytical 
approach to Marxist questions in a number of articles, culminating in the 1978 
publication of Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence (2000) winner of the Issac 
Deutscher Memorial Prize.  Cohen subsequently described the volume as “homage to the 
milieu in which I learned the plain Marxism which the book defended,” reflecting 
“gratitude to my parents, to the school which had taught me, to the political community 
in which I was raised (Cohen 2000, xxi). The book also reflected a self-conscious effort at 
rethinking Marxist method, to avoid the tendencies of the Left to murky thinking, 
tendencies to which Cohen himself, as he ruefully admits, had been prey in his 
poststructuralist phase, even if he had ultimately “resisted its intoxication.”  The book on 
Marx was thus, not just a tribute to the politics of his family, but also how he “settled 
accounts” with his “Althusserian flirtation” (Cohen 2000, xxii). 
 Cohen’s celebrated book thus inaugurated a new school of thought of “Analytical 
Marxism” which counted among its adherents a diversity of left-wing scholars, all intent 
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on setting tough intellectual standards for the inquiry into socialist principles.  They drew 
on the logical analysis of philosophy, the techniques of neoclassical economics and the 
rational choice theory of contemporary political science.  Throughout the 1980s Cohen 
met with his analytical Marxist colleagues regularly and published a number of articles on 
questions of exploitation, class, historical materialism in an analytical vein (see Cohen 
1988 for a collection of some of these writings) 
 
Cohen’s Scientific Socialism 
 
Just as Marx and Engels conceived historical materialism as a new, superior 
methodology for the critique of capitalism, Cohen can be said to have consciously sought 
a new scholarly approach, only this time informed by some of the methods and standards 
of analytical philosophy, and moreover producing a form of analysis critically to bear on 
the claims of Marxism itself.  Cohen himself invited the analogy with Marx and Engels on 
the matter of being scientific.  Cohen notes Engels’s tribute to Marx as the founder of 
“scientific socialism” which, like Cohen and his colleagues, used “the most advanced 
resources of social science…within the frame of a socialist commitment,” and which 
“exploited…what was best in the bourgeois social science of his day” (Cohen 2000, xxiii). 
Indeed, Cohen laments that if analytical Marxism had been called instead “scientific 
socialism,” then Left-wing critics of analytical Marxism would not have been disposed to 
ask the “unproductive question” of whether analytical Marxism is Marxist (Cohen 2000, 
xxvii). 
 What makes analytical Marxism scientific?  I will identify five respects, drawing 
on Cohen’s thoughts on the subject, as well as his philosophical writings.  The first respect 
can be described as a broad commitment to philosophical sharpness.  This, paired with an 
unabashed commitment to socialist ideals, meant that Cohen had an invigorating impact 
on Oxford political philosophy when he returned in 1985 to take up the Chichele Chair in 
Social and Political Theory at All Souls College.  For Cohen, claims should be precise and 
clear; arguments should be disciplined and rigorous. These qualities are conveyed in the 
famous avowal that analytical Marxism was “no-bullshit” Marxism.  The analytical 
Marxist responds to criticism by taking “precise measure of the force of the assault in 
order to alter his position in a controlled and scientifically indicated way.”  The 
bullshitter, in contrast, “simply shifts to another unthought-through and/or obscure 
position, in order to remain undefeated” (Cohen 2000, xxvi).  
 Thus Cohen took issue with Marxism itself and some of its substantive 
commitments.  For example, Cohen targeted the Marxist theory of history which he 
contended was seriously impaired by what he dubbed the “obstetric” view of the 
inevitable birth of communism from capitalist preconditions (Cohen 2000a, 75-77).  
Marxism is almost unique in its aspiring to be, not just a normative theory about the 
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injustice of capitalism and the superiority of communism, but also a predictive theory 
which forecasts the demise of one social order and its replacement by a superior 
alternative.  For Cohen, the predictive aspect is “patently false,” and moreover exemplifies 
the tendencies of Marxism to resist real standards of confirmation since the Marxist can 
keep altering the temporal measure in order to salvage its predictive claims.  
 Connected to this is a second way in which Marxism is infected with wooly 
thinking: that is, its lack of specification of the nature of communism itself, particularly 
its relations of justice.  For Cohen, attending to this gap in the Marxist tradition certainly 
did not imply soft-pedalling the radicalism of Marxian ideals.  This lacuna prompted 
Cohen to look outside of the Marxist tradition and consider liberal debates for more 
precise rendering of the principle of mitigating disadvantage.    
 Cohen began by analysing the work of the libertarian Robert Nozick and his 
conception of self-ownership.  Nozick’s ideas had many affinities with Marx’s idea of 
proletarian exploitation and the claim that the individual is sovereign over his or her 
person and powers.  However, for Cohen, in the libertarian case, the commitment to 
private property takes precedence over the ideal of the person as free, self-determining 
being; in Cohen’s compelling argument, Marxism emerges as the philosophy with the 
more principled stance on liberty.  Marxism recognises how property relations can 
constrain a person’s opportunities and powers, so that, in order to defend freedom, one 
must attack private property. 
 One of Cohen’s papers in this period had the subtitle “Why Nozick Exercises 
some Marxists more than he does any Egalitarian Liberals,” (Cohen 1990) to 
communicate the irony that thinkers at some distance from libertarians on the political 
spectrum have more in common with libertarians than do their politically more 
proximate liberal bedfellows.  But the allusion to egalitarian liberals also presaged another 
focus in contemporary political philosophy that was to emerge in Cohen’s writings.  By 
the 1980s, the era of glasnost and Thatcher, Cohen was investigating the principles and 
arguments of contemporary liberal egalitarianism.   
 For Cohen, the most important arguments for redistributing wealth were coming 
from liberals such as Rawls.  However, Rawls’s argument for redressing the position of the 
worst off had several problems.  Rawlsian justice was premised on the arbitrariness and 
injustice of inequality, and yet it conceded that the productivity necessary to attend to the 
have-nots might require incentives that permit the wealthy to retain much of their 
economic advantage.  This raised a larger question about the extent to which theories of 
justice should be construed as regulative policies tailored to non-ideal circumstances, or 
principles that transcended matters of fact. 
 Third, Cohen took the view that a defining feature of rigorous thought was that it 
eschew the kind of holism antithetical to the detailed analysis of particulars in their own 
right; “micro-analysis is always desirable and always in principle possible” (Cohen 2000, 
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xxiii). Indeed, Cohen unabashedly deployed scientific vocabulary on this point, urging 
“resolution to a more atomic level.” Pre-analytical Marxism was “scientifically 
undeveloped,” according to Cohen: 
 
… rather in the way that thermodynamics was before it was supplemented 
by statistical mechanics, and, in each case, because of failure to represent 
molar level entities (such as quantities of gas, or economic structures) as 
arrangements of their more fundamental constituents.  It is one thing to 
know, as phenomenological thermodynamics did, that the gas laws hold 
true.  It is another to know how and why they do, and that further 
knowledge requires analysis, in the narrow sense, which statistical 
mechanics provided by applying Newton’s laws to the molecular 
constituents of gases.  Partly similarly, to claim that capitalism must break 
down and give way to socialism is not yet to show how behaviours of 
individuals lead to that result.  And nothing else leads to that result, since 
behaviours of individuals are always where the action is, in the final 
analysis (Cohen 2000, xxiii-xxiv).  
 
This focus on the particular, the idea of isolating a particular question from more general 
themes or ideas, made for a tough-minded approach whereby socialist commitments had 
to be parsed into distinct premises and conclusions and tested for their validity.  
 A fourth respect in which Cohen’s method is self-consciously scientific is that he 
considers philosophical inquiry to involve intellectual progress, building on previous 
rudimentary understandings to come closer to the truth, just as scientists build on past 
discoveries in their investigations to find the explanatory structures that disclose the 
character of observed events.  Thus Cohen criticises Jon Elster for being “too insistently 
analytical” in his rejection of functional explanation, noting that “analytical Marxists can 
disagree about what stage a particular discipline or sub-discipline had reached or should 
be expected to have reached, on pain of condemnation as unscientific...” (Cohen 2000, 
xxiii). This “progressivist” view is apparent also in Cohen’s analogy with science referred 
to above: Pre-analytical Marxism was “scientifically undeveloped,” according to Cohen, 
“… rather in the way that thermodynamics was before it was supplemented by statistical 
mechanics.” 
  Related to this is a fifth sense in which analytical Marxism purports to be 
scientific.  This is its anti-pluralism.  Analytical Marxists have no truck with other 
approaches.  This might seem at odds with the openness of Cohen to non-Marxist 
political philosophies; after all, he was certainly prepared to find merit in liberal, even 
libertarian argument.  However, this openness was of course in part born of his 
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frustration with what he saw as the paucity of traditional Marxism.  It was the analytical 
nature, in large part, of liberal views which made their influence salutary.   
 According to Cohen, before analytical Marxism, there may have been non-
analytical Marxist theories which were intellectually respectable.  However, once these 
theories encounter analytical Marxism, then they “must either become analytical or 
bullshit.”  The analytical Marxist, it would appear, considers his Marxism as “uniquely 
legitimate.”  Here we see an affinity with a feature of the thought of Marx and Engels that 
is not wholly attractive.  Consider the Communist Manifesto’s scathing dismissal of other 
socialist views: 
 
In proportion as the modern class struggle develops and takes definite 
shape, this fantastic standing apart from the contest, these fantastic attacks 
on it, lose all practical value and all theoretical justification.  Therefore, 
although the originators of these systems were, in many respects, 
revolutionary, their disciples have, in every case, formed mere reactionary 
sects (Marx and Engels 1978, 498-499). 
 
Of course, the issue of pluralism is tricky.  Different approaches may shed light on 
different aspects of the socialist ideal.  More discursive analyses might be illuminating of 
some questions not considered by analytical Marxists.  Rejecting outright all other 
approaches other than one’s own, however much one’s approach seems superior to 
others, can thus seem dogmatic.   
 It might appear Cohen himself had something like this thought in mind when he 
advised his students to entertain seemingly foggy notions as they philosophise: “One 
should aspire to clarity, but one should not avoid possible insight for the sake of avoiding 
unclarity.”  However, I think this tip was intended not to confirm the value of alternative 
ways of doing philosophy but rather as an acknowledgement of the halting steps one must 
take in the uniquely valuable analytical project of aspiring to clarity (Cohen 2011, 224-
225). Thus for Cohen if one eschews relativism and seeks truth, a diversity of intellectual 
positions indicates confusion, not greater insight.  Moreover, Cohen would say analytical 
Marxists are prepared to have their arguments corrected; indeed, that is, among other 
things, what distinguishes them from “bullshit Marxists”.   
 Thus the analytical Marxists did not agree on a number of questions; take for 
example Cohen and Elster’s dispute on the question of functional explanation.  It is just 
that analytical Marxists are unmoveable on the question of what method is best placed to 
reveal the defects of an argument.  Nonetheless, there is something somewhat disquieting 
about this insistence on one path to philosophical enlightenment.  Moreover, in a post-
Soviet era, one cannot help but wonder if this severity about doctrine seems a holdover of 
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old-style orthodox Marxism which had illiberal political consequences so abhorred by 
Cohen.   
 Some academics keen on rigorous analysis can be callous or dismissive.  Cohen, in 
contrast, was always humane in his dealings with those less analytically minded.  It might 
be said that Cohen’s students would often find in his manner a kind of intimidating 
fierceness about philosophical rigour, even if he was at the same time encouraging, 
affectionate and kind.  It was often difficult to follow the wise counsel he gave his 
diffident followers: “a bad way to never make a mistake is to shut up and say nothing” 
(Cohen 2011, 225) if one feared that what one would say would not meet his high 
standards.  However, the significant philosophical contributions of a number of Cohen's 
students suggest his tutelage – both tough and kind – worked.  His “take no-prisoners” 
approach to Marxist theory set a standard that inspired students even if it also may have 
scared some of them a little.  Certainly Cohen's uncompromising commitment to 
analytical rigour made for a scientific approach to Marxism which had a profound impact 
on the development of contemporary political philosophy.   
 
Cohen’s Utopian Socialism 
 
Cohen was in a significant sense a utopian socialist, not in Marx’s sense of offering 
‘fantastic’ predictions about an ideal future, but insofar as he was prepared to endorse a 
radical alternative to existing society.  Moreover, for all his fierce denunciation of sloppy 
philosophising, the harsh critic also possessed a fundamental sympathy for his fellows, 
whose needs and interests are crucially, he contended, the responsibility of us all.  If we 
profess to be egalitarians we should not just look to the state to execute the principles of 
justice; but rather ourselves endeavour, in our everyday activity, to realise our political 
commitments. 
 If this sounds a little moralistic, it ought to be stressed that Cohen was not preachy 
or sanctimonious.  Indeed, he bristled a little at the title for the collection of essays in his 
honour, noting with his usual wit that the “egalitarian conscience” might suggest that he 
is “holier than I am. I am certainly not holier than I am; indeed, it’s a good bet that I am 
not even holier than thou.” The idea of an egalitarian conscience, he feared, made him 
seem “so grim, so inspecting, so admonishing, so unremittingly judging” (Cohen 2006, 
249). Cohen judged bad philosophy strictly, but he was not a strict person; he was 
certainly not a puritan about his socialism.  In conversation he expressed impatience with 
puritanical figures such as Orwell or Wittgenstein who lived, at times, as though to be an 
egalitarian involved a kind of purity, a foreswearing of earthly pleasures.   
 The idea of conscience remains illuminating.  Generosity, a constitutive feature of 
Cohen's character is exemplified by his conception of socialism itself, where people live in 
fellowship, sharing resources in a commitment to egalitarian principles of distribution 
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regardless of talent or ability. In Cohen's last publication, Why Not Socialism? (2009) he 
elaborates this idea with the example of a camping trip where resources are shared on the 
basis of need, and all contribute what they can.  In such a context, inequalities that are 
permissible according to the bar of justice – e.g. those that result from individuals’ 
decisions to work less hard or take risks with their share of resources – might be 
problematic by what might be called the criterion of community.  Inequality undermines 
reciprocity; if you are poor, however much the result of your own choices, you are cut off 
“from our common life” (Cohen 2009, 36-39). Cohen endorsed “luck egalitarian” theories 
which held the mitigation of disadvantage applied only in cases of bad brute luck, rather 
than “option luck” where deliberate gambles or foolish decisions left one badly off.  But 
he recognised that such arrangements, though just, would adversely affect community, 
an important egalitarian value. 
 This little book, which has come to prominence since Cohen’s death, has 
prompted some controversy about Cohen’s relationship to liberal egalitarian justice.  I 
noted that when Cohen began looking at political philosophy outside the Marxist 
tradition, he turned first to the work of the libertarian Robert Nozick; however, his main 
focus came to be the work John Rawls, and his liberal egalitarianism, since individualism 
about labour and resources had to give way, he thought, to the principle of redistribution.  
Cohen deployed the same analytical method as Rawls, but he took issue with Rawls’s 
position, arguing for what might be thought of as a truer Marxian approach to capitalist 
inequality, which calls for a transformation in consciousness and a more thorough-going 
egalitarianism.  Rawls was thus, it may be said, insufficiently utopian by Cohen’s lights.  
(Of course, for libertarians such as Jan Narveson in this volume, Rawls himself is 
problematically redistributive.1) Readers of the interesting paper by Duan Zhongqiao and 
Yi Lang on Cohen’s influence on Chinese philosophy might conclude that in light of the 
example of a society with both a precarious commitment to socialist equality and a 
persisting attachment to murky dialectical thinking, Cohen’s combination of scientific 
method and utopian ideals is salutary indeed. 
 The question of how much equality might demand of us became the centrepiece 
of Cohen’s later work.  ‘If You’re an Egalitarian, How Come You’re So Rich?’ (see Cohen 
2000 (a) and Cohen 2001) was the humorous title that Cohen formulated to pinpoint his 
misgivings about how little Rawlsian justice can demand of people’s personal 
commitments.  The title is, of course, irresistible, prompting wry grins among students at 
                                                          
1 ‘There is not, it seems to me, a genuine case for the egalitarian principle, and thus for regarding a 
justification along the lines of “incentives” as prerequisites for legitimizing our perfectly normal behaviour 
in markets and other contexts of social life - much less for regarding these as injustices that we perforce had 
probably best put up with under the circumstances.’  
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its very mention, and some imitations.2  Libertarians such as Narveson get a rejoinder in 
Colin Macleod’s paper where he takes up the question of the rich egalitarian to suggest it 
is the libertarian who is particularly vulnerable to this challenge.  After all, if the 
libertarian argues that charity, not state redistribution, is the just way of remedying 
disadvantage, the personal burden would seem particularly acute for the rightwing critic 
of social justice.  David Rondel, in contrast, suggests that the demand that principles of 
distributive justice bear on people’s personal choices lacks an important premise about 
whether any inequality not remedied by social institutions is sufficiently “morally 
serious” so as to warrant an extension of duty to individual citizens.   Pablo Gilabert has a 
similar point in mind when he commends sufficientarianism, wherein the distributive 
principle seeks to ensure all members of the community have sufficient resources, which 
he argues is the most congenial to Cohen’s embracing of community.   
 Some commentators wonder whether any theories of liberal justice can survive 
Cohen’s criterion of community.  Jeffrey Noonan also focuses on the sufficiency criterion, 
contending that Cohen’s socialism is “not essentially an egalitarian doctrine” since the 
Marxist ideal of communist society is better understood as founded on the principle of 
life sufficiency rather than a “bourgeois perspective of invidious interpersonal 
comparisons that any abstract metric of equality presupposes.”  For Nicholas Vrousalis, 
the ideal of community is not a supplement to justice, it contradicts it, and thus Cohen’s 
more radical Marxist ideal of decommodification casts considerable doubt as to whether 
even a revisionist liberal egalitarianism is compatible with socialist community.   
 It can be argued that the ideal of community which seeks flourishing lives for all 
members, rather than the acquisition of goods, is not in fact founded on the principle of 
equality.  Recall Marx and Engels’s own disdain for the bourgeois criterion of “equal 
right” and their contention that whilst it may be useful as a transitional principle in the 
fledgling socialist society, the ideal communist society would transcend such 
parsimonious measuring of one’s due with the communist ideal of the satisfaction of 
need.  In light of this, it is a suggestive claim that the Marxist Cohen was in some sense at 
odds with himself in looking to liberal egalitarianism to correct the vagaries of the 
socialist tradition.   
 However, to separate the two parts of Cohen is to diminish what is among his 
most compelling contributions: the marriage of justice and community.  Justice involves 
community insofar as remedying inequality involves, in its most ambitious form, 
                                                          
2  I’ve encountered in paper titles, blogs, reviews, the following: ‘If you’re an egalitarian how come you're 
trying to sell an undergraduate arts degree that costs more than an MBA?’  ‘...how come you’re a 
philosopher?’ ‘…how come you claimed so much in expenses?’ ‘…how come you wanna be so poor?’  
‘…how come you don’t believe in genetic enhancement?’ ‘…how come you read bedtime stories to your 
children?’  ‘…how come you’re so inegalitarian about your body?’  ‘…how come you send your children to 
private school?’ 
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foregoing the idea that distribution must be based on market success.   Community, 
according to Cohen, is expressed in the “antimarket principle according to which I serve 
you not because of what I can get in return by doing so but because you need or want my 
service” (Cohen 2009, 39). Thus, for Cohen, Rawls’s difference principle fails the test of 
community, but it also fails by Rawls’s own lights, that of justice, which depends on the 
ideal of community in order to override the logic of the market.  Theories of justice which 
permit constraining egalitarian distribution for reasons of incentives betray their own 
principles.  If all members of the community are committed to the principle of equality, 
the talented among them cannot turn around and demand higher pay.  To do so is to put 
them, as Cohen says, “outside the community” (Cohen 2009 (a), 32). 
 This critique of incentives is part of the view that, contra Rawls, a theory of justice 
should require that individuals devote themselves to the remedy of inequality in their 
personal choices more generally, rather than conceiving of the pursuit of egalitarian 
distributive principles as the prerogative of state institutions.  There may be pragmatic 
grounds for falling short of these demanding egalitarian principles, given facts about 
human behaviour, but Cohen insists these facts should have no part in a theory of justice.  
Rawls, he contends, misidentifies the question of justice with the question of what 
principles we should adopt to regulate our affairs.  And while “facts may constrain 
possibilities of implementation and determine defensible trade-offs (at the level of 
implementation) among competing principles”, the principles themselves are unaffected 
by such considerations.  “Failure to distinguish between rules of regulation and the 
principles that justify them leads to confusion of different questions” in particular, 
questions about decisions and action as opposed to norms and ideals (Cohen 2009 (a), 
269). 
 Whether Cohen was fair to Rawls is a matter of considerable debate.  Loren King 
in this volume suggests that Cohen misconstrues Rawls’s purpose, since justice as fairness 
refers not just to matters of regulation but also the way in which we should arrive at 
mutually acceptable regulative principles consistent with our conceptions of justice.  It is 
for this reason that King suggests that although Rawls and Cohen are at odds over the 
concept and conception of justice, they might in fact converge over the more practical 
matter of regulative principles.  For his part, Alistair Macleod avows that strands in 
Rawls’s writings commit him to positions at no great distance from those Cohen favours 
despite the fact that these positions are at variance with some of Rawls’s most familiar 
expressed views.  For King, Rawls in fact sought optimal principles of regulation that 
might be consistent with a variety of conceptions of justice.  I am not sure that Cohen 
would have agreed; after all, he concedes that we may need to settle for Rawlsian 
regulation in the imperfect institutions of justice within which we find ourselves.  But that 
is a long way from the ideal of justice itself.  And this ideal is central for Cohen.   
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 Interestingly, whilst some commentators find the influence of Rawls at odds with 
Cohen’s Marxism, rendering it too moderate, others contend that Cohen’s critique of 
Rawls makes him insufficiently Marxist. The latter objection centres on the compatibility 
of utopianism and realism in egalitarian theory. For the charge is, in essence, that the 
utopianism of Cohen is at odds with his claims to being scientific.  
 The target here is Cohen’s argument for a theory of justice that eschews the 
domain of facts, which it is argued, undermines the claims of Cohen to providing, like 
Marx, a scientific approach to radical politics. Lea Ypi’s essay draws on Plato's dialogue 
Parmenides to suggest infinite regress threatens Cohen’s search for ultimate fact-
independent principles. Particularly interesting is her suggestion early in the paper that 
the eschewal of facts is profoundly un-Marxist. Cohen’s preoccupation with high theory 
divorced from political action is in tension with his Marxist position since “in the case of 
Marx, any attempt to isolate principles from the world of facts, any theoretical stance 
which is also not a political one cultivates a doctrinaire spirit.” Likewise Kai Nielsen takes 
issue with Cohen’s more recent work, finding it at odds with his “masterful” work on 
historical materialism; moreover, he contends, such metaethical accounts, even if they are 
right, have little to do with the project of socialism. The worry about the utility of political 
philosophy also prompts Kofman to complain that “some consideration” of how theories 
“bear on the facts of the human condition” is essential for their justification. 
 It is worth pondering the role of utopianism in political thought. Political 
philosophy is distinctive in that in its very effort to address the normative question of 
how we are to live in common, it must take account of an empirical reality which throws 
up, for example, the problem of scarcity, the constraints of human nature, the dynamics 
of social change. The more radical our political philosophies, the more they seek to 
transcend this empirical reality. To that extent they inevitably risk looking utopian, being 
unrealistic or ungrounded in the facts of politics and power. Yet of course political 
philosophy cannot be reduced to a mere assent to the world as we find it; it must be a 
normative enterprise, concerned with human progress and social improvement. So it is 
related to the utopian, in some sense, at least in its aspiration.  Thus Cohen feared that if 
justice and equality were not “rescued” from “facts,” the result would be a diminished 
ambition for normative political theory. Here “utopian” means articulating principles, 
established independent of factual considerations, and arguing that political reality 
should be made to conform to them.  Of course, the principles established by such a 
method may be very minimal in their aspirations and thus the society that conformed to 
them would not have the characteristics normally associated with a utopia.  However, in 
Cohen’s case, the principles constitute a vision of society that is thoroughly egalitarian, 
and to that extent it might be dubbed utopia. 
 
Conclusion 
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Jerry Cohen’s final contributions affirm his commitment to an ambitious ideal of 
socialism, derived from Marx’s idea of “communist man” who transcends narrow 
bourgeois egoism. In essence, Cohen is a utopian socialist – not in the sense attacked by 
Marx, where one simply posits a better society without thinking about the historical 
circumstances that might get us there – but in the best sense of proposing a robust set of 
egalitarian ideals.  This is evidenced in his insistence on a radical approach to justice 
based on “principles” rather than “facts,” and moreover his contention that a consistent 
egalitarianism involves personal contributions to the pursuit of equality. In Cohen’s 
insistence that the ambitions of political theory should transcend the world of facts, many 
thought he had parted company with the scientific basis of the Marxist tradition, 
suggesting that Marx’s critique of utopian socialism would ironically apply to Cohen 
himself, the political philosopher who counted his most important achievement to be the 
revival of a scientific approach to socialist ideals. However, for Cohen, what makes 
Marxist political philosophy scientific is not the data of science, but an approach 
characterised by rigour and discipline. Indeed, for Cohen, the project of distinguishing 
facts from principles was itself illuminated by the application of such a scientific 
approach. 
 Cohen was right to demand that political philosophy be understood within the 
domain of ideals. A political theory that seeks to dispense with utopian objectives, the 
aspiration to an ideal, is paradoxically, utopian itself. Utopia per se is of course not a live 
option; the ideal society will always be beyond the grasp of flawed mortals. But some kind 
of utopian imperative, such as that of equal human flourishing, community, the equal 
realisation of human needs, which seeks to go beyond the given, is essential to the very 
task of political philosophy, and certainly the political philosophy of G.A. Cohen. We 
should, like Cohen, affirm the utopian aspiration in political philosophy without falling 
prey to a utopianism about how to achieve that aspiration. 
 To the surprise of many of his friends and admirers, towards the end of his life 
Cohen defended the conservative idea of “conserving intrinsic value.” Cohen insisted this 
“conservative attitude” involved an appreciation for the fleeting things of value that are 
vulnerable to change and destruction.  Cohen’s conservatism, he underscored, did not 
entail a conservative view on matters of justice; indeed, he noted that sometimes social 
change is required to protect those things of value, “to revolutionize our situation.”  He 
noted that “one thing Karl Marx said about the socialist revolution was that that 
revolution was necessary to preserve the fruits of civilization against the ravages of 
capitalism” (Cohen 2011 (a)). The idea of preserving value is perhaps what animates this 
volume itself – to hold on to the ideas and the example of a unique philosopher and 
socialist.  Essential to Cohen’s uniqueness is that he was both scientific and utopian, and 
that marriage made for a particularly stimulating and rigorous intellectual contribution 
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that we should cherish and nurture.  As Jerry said to me once, quoting Ezra Pound: “what 
thou lovest well remains, the rest is dross.” 
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